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Bonnie Gray was an elderly woman living in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
who sought medical services from Wasatch Endoscopy Center in 2004.1
After Medicare covered most of her medical bills, Mrs. Gray was left with 
a bill for $90.73, which, being on a fixed income, she was unable to pay at 
the time.2
The following year, the medical center assigned Mrs. Gray’s bill to a 
debt collector, who sent her a letter threatening to sue her in state court if 
she did not immediately pay the $90.73.3 The collector also sent her a “10-
day Summons” and a “Proposed Complaint,” a device used in Utah to im-
ply that a suit may be filed within ten days following the notice.4 Fright-
ened by the risk of a lawsuit, Mrs. Gray called the collection agency and 
stated she “could bring a check the very same day.”5 Mrs. Gray’s income 
was limited to social security, which is exempt from collection activity;6
however, she was afraid of the potential repercussions and decided to pay 
the debt with her social security benefits. When making the payment, the 
collection agency also informed Mrs. Gray that she had to pay $250 in 
attorney’s fees for the lawsuit. When Mrs. Gray protested the amount as 
unfair because a suit had not yet been filed, the representative told her that 
                                                          
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law (Dec. 2013). The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth 
De Armond for her invaluable insight and editorial assistance. 
 1. Gray v. Parry, No. 2:07-CV-113, 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 821592, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2008). 
 2. Id.
 3. Id.
 4. Amended Complaint at ¶ 68, Gray v. Parry, No. 2:07-CV-113, 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 821592 
(D. Utah June 25, 2007-2008) [hereinafter Gray Complaint]. 
 5. Id.
 6. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 407(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74); Philpott v. Essex Cnty. 
Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 415 (1973). 
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the lawsuit had indeed been filed, when in fact the suit was not filed until 
one week after the payment was made.7
The debt collector’s actions were deceptive under the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) for several reasons. First and foremost, 
the collector misrepresented the legal status of the debt when it told Mrs. 
Gray it had filed a lawsuit when it had not.8 Second, the debt collector did 
not likely have the right to charge Mrs. Gray for any legal fees in the ab-
sence of an actual suit.9 Mrs. Gray filed a lawsuit in federal court to enforce 
her claim under the FDCPA. However, the district court abstained from 
hearing the case since Mrs. Gray had filed the same complaint as a coun-
terclaim in her state court case where an appeal was still pending.10 In the 
end, the state court did not permit Mrs. Gray to amend her counterclaims to 
include the FDCPA complaint. Rather, the court held that Mrs. Gray had 
paid the debt at “about the same time” as the state court lawsuit was filed,11
even though the check was cashed a full week before the collector filed 
their lawsuit.12 Clearly, there was no lawsuit filed at the time Mrs. Gray 
paid the collector’s attorney’s fees. 
Contrast Mrs. Gray’s case with that of the DeHarts in New Jersey. In 
2011, Mr. and Mrs. DeHart brought an FDCPA claim against their bank 
after the bank threatened to foreclose on the DeHart’s home if they did not 
become current with their mortgage payments and pay $600 in attorneys’ 
fees.13 As in Mrs. Gray’s case, no foreclosure case had actually been filed, 
and so it was against New Jersey state law to demand attorney’s fees from 
a consumer.14 By law, the DeHarts could have just paid their missed mort-
gage payments (plus interest) to successively reinstate their mortgage.15
However, the letter sent to the DeHarts did not make it clear that attorney’s 
fees were not required, and in a victory for the DeHarts, the court held that 
the letter was misleading and deceptive under the FDCPA.16
In both cases, debt collectors attempted to illegally collect attorney’s 
fees from consumers in connection with the collection of an underlying 
                                                          
 7. The state court noted that the suit was filed “about the same time” as Mrs. Gray’s payment and 
denied Mrs. Gray’s petition to amend her counterclaims to include an FDCPA counterclaim. Gray, 2008 
U.S. Dist. WL 821592, at *2. 
 8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74). 
 9. Gray Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 157. 
 10. Gray, 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 821592, at *5. 
 11. Id. at *2. 
 12. Gray Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 75. 
 13. DeHart v. U.S. Bank, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1054 (D.N.J. 2011). 
 14. Id. at 1055. 
 15. Id.
 16. Id.
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debt. In both cases, the collectors misled the consumer as to the necessity 
of paying those fees. And in both cases, the collectors were collecting these 
fees from consumers across the state, so much so that both Mrs. Gray and 
the DeHarts filed class action suits on behalf of all similarly situated con-
sumers in their respective states.17 Thus, when one court abstained from 
hearing the FDCPA case and the other did not, the inconsistency in justice 
was amplified across hundreds of consumers. 
Unfortunately, this story does not end with Mrs. Gray and the 
DeHarts. United States district courts throughout the federal court system 
apply abstention doctrine to FDCPA cases in varied and different ways,18
leading to confusion among consumers and running counter to the princi-
ples of justice and fairness, which are crucial to the legitimacy of our court 
system.19
This note will explore the practice of federal district courts abstaining 
from hearing consumer FDCPA claims related to state court cases, will 
attempt to group FDCPA claims into two types, and will recommend that 
district courts consider the type of claim before making the abstention deci-
sion. Further, this note will argue that a consistent application of abstention 
doctrine in the FDCPA arena will better serve consumers. In Part I, this 
note defines and explains the abstention doctrine, focusing on the more 
common Colorado River and Younger doctrines, along with mention of 
other more seldom used abstention doctrines. Part II defines the FDCPA 
and explains why Congress passed the Act, and how Congress intended the 
Act to be used. Part III reviews and categorizes the application of absten-
tion doctrines in FDCPA cases throughout the federal court system. Final-
ly, Part IV advocates for a consistent application of abstention doctrine in 
consumer FDCPA cases. 
I. ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Abstention doctrine is a relatively new phenomenon in American ju-
risprudence. Beginning in 1941 with Rail Road Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman Co., the Supreme Court held that a federal district court could 
“[stay] its hands” in the absence of a showing that a state court ruling could 
                                                          
 17. Id. at 1054; Gray v. Parry, No. 2:07-CV-113, 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 821592, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 
27, 2008). 
 18. Based on the author’s survey of federal court cases where the court analyzes a request to 
abstain in an FDCPA case, conducted using Westlaw and Lexis in October 2012 (i.e., does not include 
cases where court does not reach the issue). Michael Wood, Survey of FDCPA Cases Where Court 
Considers Abstention (Oct. 11, 2012) (unpublished survey).  
 19. Michelle Maiese, Principles of Justice and Fairness, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (July 2003), 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/principles-of-justice.  
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not properly address the merits of the case while protecting the parties’ 
constitutional claims.20 That is, it is preferable to avoid a constitutional 
question altogether when a case can be resolved on issues of state law.21
Prior to that ruling, Chief Justice Marshall’s perspective guided juris-
prudence in this area: 
It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: 
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should. The judi-
ciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it ap-
proaches the confines of the constitution . . . . With whatever doubts, 
with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if 
it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The 
one or the other would be treason to the constitution.22
Since Pullman, the abstention doctrine has tended to consist of four 
general types of abstention: (1) the aforementioned avoidance of deciding a 
constitutional question where state law may dispose of an issue; (2) the 
refrain from conflict with a state’s ability to administer its own affairs; (3) a 
deference to the rights of states to resolve their own unsettled questions of 
state law; and lastly, (4) the avoidance of piecemeal and duplicative litiga-
tion.23 This note will address each doctrine in order, though it should be 
noted that the lines between each doctrine are not clear and that “[t]he vari-
ous types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts 
must try to fit cases.”24 To underscore that point, this note will devote a 
short section following the four major doctrines to describing some lesser-
known and lesser-used abstention doctrines. 
A. Pullman Abstention Doctrine 
The Pullman Company (“Pullman”) brought an action against the 
Railroad Commission of Texas (“Commission”) for requiring that all 
sleeper cars have Pullman conductors working on them.25 The order made 
illegal Pullman’s practice of employing lower-paid porters on trains with 
only one sleeper car, a practice which the company employed to reduce 
costs and to avoid hiring an additional conductor to manage only one 
                                                          
 20. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 54 (2012). 
 21. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 20. 
 22. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISDICTION AND 
RELATED MATTERS § 4241 (2013) (citing Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)). 
 23. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 20.  
 24. Id. (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)). 
 25. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 497-498 (1941). 
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sleeper car.26 Pullman argued the ruling violated the Commerce, Due Pro-
cess, and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution.27
The Supreme Court agreed that there were significant constitutional 
issues in the case, but noted that the basis for the Commission’s original 
authority to create the requirement was unclear under Texas state law.28
Rather than rule on the constitutional issues, which would become moot if 
the Texas Supreme Court found that the Commission had not had the au-
thority to create such a regulation in the first place, the Court ordered the 
district court to abstain to “avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as 
the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.”29
Moving forward, courts analyze three elements when considering ab-
stention under Pullman: (1) the case includes both state and constitutional 
federal issues; (2) the state issues involve unsettled matters of state law; 
and (3) the resolution of those unsettled matters of state law may resolve or 
make moot the federal constitutional matter.30
B. Burford Abstention Doctrine 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., another case against the Texas Railroad 
Commission, involved the Commission’s issuance of a permit to allow 
Burford to drill four small oil wells in an East Texas oil field.31 The case 
concerned technical details about the spacing between the oil wells and the 
Court noted that the “geologic complexities in deciding when additional 
wells are needed” is best regulated by a state administrative agency.32 The 
Court went on to hold that intervening in the operation of a state agency 
“could lead only to delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless 
federal conflict with the State policy.”33
Burford allows abstention when federal adjudication would “unduly 
intrude upon complex state administrative processes.”34 In Burford, the oil 
field in question was approximately forty miles long, had nearly 26,000 
wells drilled on it, and surface rights divided among 900 different parties. 
Any one party could draw oil from under another party’s surface holding, 
                                                          
 26. Id. at 497. 
 27. Id. at 498. 
 28. Id. at 498-99. 
 29. Id. at 500. 
 30. Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Prof’l Licensing of the Dep’t of Commerce of the State of 
Utah, 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 31. 319 U.S. 315, 317 (1943). 
 32. 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22. 
 33. Id. (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 34. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989). 
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requiring a complex system of regulation. The doctrine recognizes that at 
times, federal review might disrupt “efforts [by a state] to establish a co-
herent state policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”35
C. Younger Abstention Doctrine 
Younger v. Harris involved a criminal defendant that, in the midst of 
his state court criminal proceeding, sued the District Attorney (“DA”) of 
Los Angeles County in federal court asking the court to enjoin the DA from 
prosecuting him.36 The Supreme Court held that abstention was necessary, 
relying upon a “fundamental policy against federal interference with state 
criminal prosecutions.”37 Although at first limited to preventing federal 
courts from enjoining state criminal proceedings, the doctrine expanded to 
include state civil proceedings, and eventually, state administrative pro-
ceedings.38
A court analyzes three elements in considering abstention under 
Younger: (1) there must be an ongoing state proceeding; (2) proceedings 
must implicate an important state interest; and (3) there must be an ade-
quate opportunity to raise federal challenges in the state forum.39
Ultimately, Younger abstention is “mandated if the State’s interests in 
the proceedings are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power 
would disregard the comity extended between the States and the National 
Government.”40 As such, it is a fairly malleable standard,41 which has been 
successfully raised in some FDCPA cases.42
                                                          
 35. Id. at 350. 
 36. 401 U.S. 37, 38 (1971). 
 37. Id. at 46 (reversing district court’s decision that it had jurisdiction to restrain the DA from 
prosecuting).
 38. 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISDICTION AND 
RELATED MATTERS § 4254 (3d ed. 2013). 
 39. See, e.g., Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922 (2009). Note 
that the Whittiker court listed the third requirement as an opportunity to raise constitutional claims in 
state court, whereas some courts have expanded the doctrine to apply if there is an opportunity to raise 
federal claims in state court, not necessarily limiting it to constitutional claims. See also Goolsby v. 
Deutche Bank, No. 1:12–CV–00118, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 1435735, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2010); 
Mattson v. Lasalle Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 09-C-662, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL 1956674, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July 
7, 2009). 
 40. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 2 (1987). 
 41. Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to 
State Court Proceedings A Response to Professor Stravitz, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 184 (1989). 
 42. See, e.g., Vitranschart, Inc. v. Levy, No. 00Civ.3618 (SHS), 2000 U.S. Dist. WL 1239081, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000). 
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D. Colorado River Abstention Doctrine 
Colorado River is an effort by federal courts to avoid duplicative liti-
gation.43 The United States brought suit in the District Court of Colorado to 
assert its water rights against 1,000 water users in Colorado.44 Colorado 
had enacted legislation creating a series of Water Divisions to manage 
these rights through a State Engineer, and one of the defendants in the fed-
eral case joined the United States to a state proceeding analyzing the same 
issue.45 The court stated a general rule that the existence of a parallel action 
in state court is no reason for federal courts to abstain, and that  
the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the 
presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial 
administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances ap-
propriate for abstention. The former circumstances, though exceptional, 
do nevertheless exist.”46 The court then found such circumstances to ap-
ply because the United States had specifically created a law to consent to 
federal jurisdiction in state courts in matters regarding water rights.47
Thus, abstaining “furthers the policy [expressed by] the McCarran 
Amendment.48
In Colorado River, the Court enumerated a series of factors for federal 
courts to consider in determining the existent of “exceptional circumstanc-
es.” While those factors have changed slightly over time, and among cir-
cuits, the most common set includes (1) whether the state has assumed 
jurisdiction over property at issue in the federal case; (2) the inconvenience 
of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; 
(4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained; (5) the source of govern-
ing law; (6) the adequacy of the state court action to protect the federal 
plaintiff’s rights; (7) the relative progress of state and federal proceedings; 
(8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction; (9) the availability of 
removal; and (10) the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim.49
No single factor is determinative, and the weight given to any particular 
factor will vary depending on the circumstances of the case.50 The factors 
                                                          
 43. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 20. 
 44. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 800 (1976). 
 45. Id. (noting that the United States had consented to jurisdiction “in any suit (1) for the adjudica-
tion of water rights, or (2) the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States 
owns or is acquiring such rights by appropriation under state law or otherwise.”). 
 46. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 20. (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)). 
 47. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 800. 
 48. Id.
 49. AXA Corporate Solutions v. Underwriters Reinsurance Corp., 347 F.3d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 50. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983); LaDuke v. 
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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are not intended to be a “mechanical checklist,”51 but instead are “to be 
applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the 
case at hand.”52
E. Other Abstention Doctrines 
While the majority of district courts abstain under one of the doctrines 
listed above,53 other lesser-used abstention doctrines are briefly described 
below.
1. Brillhart/Wilton 
Brillhart/Wilton abstention doctrine has its basis in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which provides “[i]n a case of actual 
controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon 
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not 
further relief is or could be sought.”54 The doctrine originated in Brillhart v. 
Excess Insurance Co. of America55 and was reaffirmed in Wilton v. Seven 
Falls Co.56 The Court held in Brillhart that the Declaratory Judgment Act 
confers discretion upon district courts to declare the legal rights of parties 
to a case, but not an absolute right of litigants to that declaration.57 The 
Court went on to suggest that actions, which are already pending in state 
court, might be an appropriate situation in which to stay the federal ac-
tion.58
Brillhart/Wilton is rarely raised, and has not yet been considered by a 
court, in cases seeking relief under the FDCPA. Declaratory relief is often 
requested as a remedy in FDCPA cases through other counts, including 
quiet title claims,59 requests that the federal court prohibit defendant from 
proceeding with its concurrent state court action (frequently a foreclo-
                                                          
 51. LaDuke, 879 F.2d at 1559. 
 52. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. 
 53. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 20. 
 54. Beals v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 10-5427 (KSH), 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 5415174, at *8 
(D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011) (internal quotation omitted). 
 55. 316 U.S. 491 (1942). 
 56. 515 U.S. 277 (1995). For a discussion on both cases, see Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Applica-
tion of Brillhart-Wilton Abstention Doctrine, Enunciated in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 
U.S. 491, 62 S. Ct. 1173, 86 L. Ed. 1620 (1942), in Action Seeking Declaratory Relief Under the De-
claratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202, 63 A.L.R. FED. 2d 51, § 2 (2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.
 59. See, e.g., Karl v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1249 (D. Nev. 2010). 
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sure),60 and requests that the federal court invalidate an obligation between 
the plaintiff and defendant (e.g., a mortgage, a contract, etc.).61 However, 
the FDCPA itself does not provide declaratory relief.62
2. Anti-Injunction Act 
The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibits federal courts 
from staying any state court proceedings.63 FDCPA cases necessarily in-
volve an underlying transaction around which the FDCPA plaintiff claims 
violations by the defendant (e.g., a mortgage or a credit card debt). Often 
that underlying transaction is itself the subject of a state court action, such 
as a foreclosure suit, and the plaintiff requests relief from that state action 
in addition to their statutory relief under the FDCPA.64 In some cases, 
where diversity jurisdiction is lacking, a plaintiff may use the FDCPA 
claim as the basis for pendant jurisdiction to gain access to the federal fo-
rum to litigate counts far more valuable than the relief available under the 
FDCPA.65
While courts refer to this “gamesmanship” when analyzing Colorado
River factors, they tend not to abstain under the Anti-Injunction act.66
Courts offer a variety of reasons for not abstaining under the Anti-
Injunction Act: (1) the relief requested is not a stay of any court proceed-
ing, but rather more general relief such as “compelling Defendants to cease 
their unlawful actions”;67 (2) the case falls under an exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act (e.g. claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may result in the stay of 
a state court proceeding);68 or (3) because the state court action does not 
meet the Act’s required burden that the state court proceeding would “seri-
ously impair[]” the federal courts ability to adjudicate the case.69
                                                          
 60. See, e.g., Roberts v. American Bank and Trust, 835 F. Supp. 2d 183, 194 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 61. See, e.g., Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 3:10-cv-423-J-34TEM, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 
4529604, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 30, 2011) (asking court to dissolve promissory note). 
 62. Vitullo v. Mancini, 684 F. Supp. 2d 760, 766-67 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[T]he FDCPA does not 
permit private litigants to seek injunctive or declaratory relief that has the effect of cancelling or extin-
guishing a debt . . . [i]nstead, these litigants are limited to the damages [provided by statute]”). 
 63. A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court 
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to 
protect or effectuate its judgments. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74). 
 64. See, e.g., Roberts, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
 65. See, e.g., Stampley v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 583 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 66. See, e.g., Beals v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 10-5427 (KSH), 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 5415174, 
at *7-8 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); In re Madera, No. 07-CV1396, 
2008 U.S. DistWL 447497 at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008).  
 67. Beals, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 5415174, at *4. 
 68. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 226 (holding that Congress authorized the federal courts to stay actions 
in state courts that deprive a party of their constitutional rights). 
 69. Madera, 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 447497, at *5. 
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II. THE FDCPA
Congress passed the FDCPA in 1977 in response to an abundance of 
abusive debt collection practices that were taking place across the coun-
try.70 Congress felt that these practices were contributing materially to the 
increasing number of personal bankruptcies, job losses, and marital prob-
lems among consumers.71 Further, Congress did not believe that there was 
adequate existing law to address these practices, which included the use of 
“obscene or profane language, threats of violence, telephone calls at unrea-
sonable hours, misrepresentations of a consumer’s legal rights, disclosing a 
consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtain-
ing information about a consumer through false pretense, impersonating 
public officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process.”72
The FDCPA permits consumers to bring an action to enforce their 
rights under the act in a United States district court without regard for the 
amount in controversy, or to bring an action in “any other court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.”73 In 2011, 11,811 FDCPA cases were filed in federal 
district courts,74 while an unknown number of FDCPA counterclaims were 
brought in state courts.75 The debt collection industry itself has grown to 
$12.2 billion in 2011,76 and while national figures on the number of debt 
collection lawsuits filed against consumers are not available, one major 
collector in the industry filed 245,000 cases in 2009.77
To put the number of FDCPA cases in the federal and state courts into 
context, and to understand the intent of Congress with respect to enforce-
ment of the FDCPA, it is important to describe the concept of the private
attorney general.
                                                          
 70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74). 
 71. Id.
 72. Matthew W. Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: How the FDCPA is Failing Ameri-
ca’s Elderly Debtors, 16 ELDER L.J. 135, 140 (2008). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74). 
 74. FDCPA Lawsuits Set Another Record in 2011, INSIDEARM.COM (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://www.insidearm.com/daily/collection-laws-regulations/collection-laws-and-regulations/fdcpa-
lawsuits-set-another-record-in-2011/. 
 75. Given the lack of any consistent electronic system to track state court claims, it is not possible 
to know how many FDCPA counterclaims are filed, or even how many debt collection lawsuits overall 
are filed.  
 76. U.S. Debt Collection Industry Worth $12.2 Billion, PRWEB.COM (Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/4/prweb9383739.htm. 
 77. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom—in Lawsuits, THE 
WALLSTREET JOURNAL (Nov. 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023045107045
75562212919179410.html. 
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Congress intended the FDCPA to be enforced by debtors, acting as 
“private attorney[s] general” to bring cases against bad actors,78 as opposed 
to relying on criminal statutes or administrative complaint processes 
through state attorneys general, as, for example, many insurance matters 
are handled. The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
viewed the legislation “primarily as self-enforcing; consumers who have 
been subjected to collection abuses will be enforcing compliance.”79 Thus, 
it was the intent of Congress that consumers be the enforcers of this legisla-
tion, which is why the large number of FDCPA cases in federal courts is 
desirable from the perspective of Congress. It is also the reason why federal 
courts should be wary of abstaining from hearing FDCPA cases since con-
sumers may not have an alternative forum in which to effectively enforce 
their consumer rights. 
The FDCPA is divided into several parts, each describing conduct by 
debt collectors that creates liability, including acquisition of location in-
formation, communication in connection with debt collection, harassment 
or abuse, false or misleading representations, and unfair practices.80 Con-
duct barred by the statute may be the actions a collector takes with respect 
to the collection of a debt (regardless of the validity of the underlying 
debt),81 or the collector’s representation of the validity of the debt (regard-
less of how benign the collection activity is). That is, a very polite call to a 
consumer regarding a debt the collector knows is not owed is just as much 
a violation of the FDCPA as a debt collector physically threatening vio-
lence when collecting a valid debt. This distinction becomes important in 
Section III, where I will describe how abstention doctrine is applied to 
FDCPA cases in the federal courts. 
III. ABSTENTION DOCTRINE APPLIED TO FDCPA CASES
This section will examine how abstention doctrine has been applied in 
FDCPA cases throughout the federal court system, looking at the trend 
over time, by circuit, by doctrine, and finally, by decision to abstain. The 
author surveyed all cases available in Lexis and Westlaw where courts 
considered abstaining from hearing an FDCPA case. Cases in which the 
court did not reach the issue were not counted. The final pool of available 
cases was fifty. It should be noted that the vast majority of FDCPA cases 
settle out of court meaning that the number of cases where a court opinion 
                                                          
 78. Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 79. S. REP. NO. 95-382, 5, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. 
 80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e-f (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74).  
 81. DeHart v. US Bank, 811 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1046 (D. N.J. 2011). 
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is available is a small subset of all FDCPA cases, and the number of opin-
ions in which abstention doctrine is discussed is even smaller still.82 How-
ever, the pool is large enough to detect some trends. 
A. Abstention Doctrine and the FDCPA Over Time 
Abstention in FDCPA cases is a new phenomenon.83 Before 2007, 
there were only eight cases where courts ruled on abstention issues in an 
FDCPA case.84 Since 2007, there are nearly that many cases ruling on the 
issue each year.85 This is likely because of the rise in foreclosure cases in 
the period following the housing bubble in the late 2000’s, which are par-
ticularly problematic with respect to federal and state court comity given 
the central issue of property within the state’s borders. Courts often find 
property to invoke important state interests, a key factor in both Colorado
River and Younger doctrine analyses.86
                                                          
 82. For example, there are an estimated 11,811 FDCPA cases filed in 2011, of which 1459 have 
written opinions available in Westlaw (published and unpublished), of which 11 discuss abstention. See
FDCPA Lawsuits Set Another Record in 2011, supra note 74. 
 83. Wood, supra note 18 (survey). 
 84. Id.
 85. Id.
 86. See, e.g., Lyons v. WM Specialty Mortg. LLC, No. 08-cv-00018-WYD-BNB, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
WL 2811810, at *7 (D. Col July 18, 2008); Beck v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CIV.A. 10-4652, 2011 
WL 3664287, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2011). 













Abstention decisions in FDCPA cases by year, regardless of whether 
the court ultimately abstained, but where the court did reach the issue.87
B. Federal District Court Abstentions by Location 
A survey of FDCPA cases where abstention is considered reveals no 
clear difference among district courts in different circuits with respect to 
the issue coming up.88 More interestingly, each circuit has a district court 
that has considered the issue at least once since 2010, with the exception of 
the D.C. and Federal Circuits, which have never considered the issue at all. 
In fact, nearly half of FDCPA cases to consider abstention have taken place 
in the last three years, which is remarkable given the first case to take up 
the issue was in 1990.89 Clearly, there is a trend in district courts consider-
ing abstention in FDCPA cases with unresolved underlying state court cas-
es. 
                                                          
 87. Wood, supra note 18 (survey). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Keating, 753 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 














District courts considering abstention in FDCPA cases sit in 
most federal circuits, with the exception of the D.C. and Federal Cir-
cuits. The tenth circuit has considered the issue most often.90
With respect to preference for abstention, the author’s survey is incon-
clusive. Some circuit’s district courts have exclusively abstained (First, 
Eighth, and Eleventh) while the district courts in the Ninth circuit have 
never abstained. But the raw numbers are too small to draw any conclu-
sions on preference among the district courts of each circuit. 
                                                          
 90. Wood, supra note 18 (survey). 
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Many district courts in each circuit have split on the application of absten-
tion doctrine to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act cases.91
C. Federal District Court Abstentions by Doctrine 
There are four abstention doctrines currently in use in the federal court 
system.92 As described above, they are (1) Pullman abstention, or the 
avoidance of deciding on a constitutional issue where resolution of unset-
tled state law may dispose of the issue;93 (2) Burford abstention, the refrain 
from conflict with a state’s complex administrative processes;94 (3) Young-
er abstention, or the avoidance of federal interference with state court crim-
inal, civil, or administrative proceedings;95 and (4) Colorado River 
abstention, or the avoidance of piecemeal and duplicative litigation.96
                                                          
 91. Id. (note that the DC Circuit and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal hear very few FDCPA 
cases and have not considered abstention in those cases). 
 92. Though, as stated above, these doctrines are not “pigeonholes,” and courts may use other 
forms of abstention. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, § 54 The Abstention Doctrines. (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 
(1987)). 
 93. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). 
 94. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943). 
 95. 17B CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4254 (3d ed. 
2013). 
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Pullman abstention doctrine is a poor fit for FDCPA cases because 
FDCPA cases do not tend to involve constitutional issues.97 The exception 
lies in bad check collection activity that has been coordinated with local 
district attorney’s offices, thereby involving a state actor, which can result 
in constitutional claims.98 But in those cases, as in most FDCPA cases, the 
underlying debt collection state suit does not implicate matters of unsettled 
state law.99 On the contrary, state law with respect to debt collection and 
foreclosure is fairly well developed. 
The Burford framework is not frequently invoked in FDCPA cases 
because Fair Debt cases are far less complex and generally limited to a 
small set of underlying state court actions, including foreclosure, debt col-
lection, bad checks, and occasionally seizure of property.100 Therefore, 
there is not much risk of a federal court interfering with complex state ad-
ministrative processes. Even in the one FDCPA case where a federal court 
abstained on the basis of Burford, the court noted that Burford is not only 
designed to prevent interference with complex state administrative process-
es, but also to “safeguard the integrity of state law,” thus relying on a dif-
ferent interpretation of Burford altogether.101 Further, the parties to an 
FDCPA action, typically a consumer and a debt collector, do not invoke the 
same complexities as transactions between commercial players in highly 
regulated industries with robust state regulation mechanisms (e.g. energy, 
manufacturing, etc.). 
Younger is a good fit for FDCPA cases in which consumers are com-
plaining about misrepresentation during a foreclosure because the three 
elements required under Younger are naturally present in a foreclosure 
case: (1) an ongoing state proceeding (i.e. the foreclosure action itself) that, 
(2) implicates an important state interest where, and (3) there is an adequate 
opportunity to raise federal challenges.102
First, by its very nature, an FDCPA case involves an ongoing state 
proceeding as a consumer is often complaining about a defendant’s action 
                                                          
 97. Wood, supra note 18 (survey). 
 98. Including Indiana and Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Hamilton v. American Corrective Counseling, 
No. 3:05-CV-434RM, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL 3332828, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2006); Shouse v. Na-
tional Corrective Group, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-0175, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 4942222, at *3 (M.D. Pa. No-
vember 30, 2010). 
 99. See e.g. Zhang v. Haven-Scott Associates, Inc., No. CIV.A. 95–2126, 1996 U.S. Dist. WL 
355344, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996). 
 100. In a survey of cases applying Burford abstention doctrine to an FDCPA claim, the author only 
found one: Manson v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. 08-12166-RGS, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL 3001203, at *2 
(D. Mass. Jul. 28, 2010). 
 101. Id. at *2 (citing New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 
491 U.S. 350 (1989)). 
 102. Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 914, 922 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
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regarding the subject of a state action (i.e., the foreclosure case). Second, 
courts typically consider issues relating to real property located within its 
jurisdiction an important state interest.103 Third, the FDCPA explicitly 
permits a claim to be brought “in any . . . court of competent jurisdiction,” 
including as a counterclaim in the consumer’s state court foreclosure 
case.104
In fact, an analysis of Younger abstention in foreclosure related cases 
reveals that where a consumer pleads an FDCPA counterclaim in their state 
court action, federal courts almost always abstain.105 The analysis only 
becomes interesting when the consumer does not plead the FDCPA coun-
terclaim in state court, and the federal court must then decide whether the 
opportunity to have done so is enough to meet Younger. This requires an 
analysis of whether FDCPA counterclaims are compulsory in state court.106
There is some disagreement among district courts as to whether FDCPA 
claims associated with a state court claim are compulsory counterclaims in 
that state court case. Some courts find that because “[t]he same operative 
facts serve as the basis of both claims . . . the logical relationship between 
them is established.”107 But the majority of courts hold that where consum-
ers do not bring the FDCPA claim as a counterclaim in state court, they are 
permitted to bring it in federal court.108 An analysis of whether FDCPA 
counterclaims are compulsory is a topic for another article, and would like 
likely help courts make a more consistent determination. 
Colorado River is also frequently used by federal courts to abstain 
from hearing FDCPA claims.109 It is a flexible doctrine with the lowest 
burden against exercising jurisdiction for the federal court.110 That is, “the 
decision whether to surrender jurisdiction is necessarily left to the district 
                                                          
 103. Beck v. Wells Fargo Banks, NA, No. 10–4652, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 3664287, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 19, 2011) (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996) (issues of property 
are typically considered by courts to implicate important state interests). 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74).  
 105. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding 
that raising the same claims in federal court that were raised in state court is an inappropriate attack on a 
state court judgment), aff’d, Figueroa v. MERSCORP, Inc., 477 F. App’x 558 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 106. See Hart v. Clayton-Parker & Assoc,, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 774, 777 (D. Ariz. 1994) (collecting 
cases showing FDCPA claims are not compulsory). But see Rader v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 
No. 07-cv-00635-WDM-MEH, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 3119543, at *9 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2007) (holding 
that an FDCPA claim was compulsory in the underlying state court action). 
 107. Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase Nat. Corp. Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-423-J-34TEM, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. WL 4529604, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2011) (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 108. E.g., DeHart v. US Bank, 811 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1046 (D. N.J. 2011) (not making the distinc-
tion between compulsory and permissive counterclaims). 
 109. Wood, supra note 18 (survey). 
 110. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983). 
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Colorado River, 15Younger, 12
Pullman, 1
Burford, 1 Anti Injunction, 1
court,” which can only be reversed in that decision if it is found to have 
abused that discretion.111 Its ten factors provide the court many paths to 
abstention as they perform a factor analysis in “a flexible manner with a 
view to the realities of the case at hand.”112
Compare that flexibility with Younger’s “strong federal policy against 
federal court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent 
extraordinary circumstances” espoused by the Supreme Court in Middlesex
County Ethics Committee.113 Where Younger requires a “proper respect for 
state functions,”114 implying that the federal court must stay its hand when 
there is the potential to interfere with state proceedings, Colorado River 
leaves to the court’s discretion how to best promote “wise judicial admin-
istration.”115
The following chart illustrates the above analysis, showing a slight 
preference for Colorado River abstention and almost exclusive use of either 
Younger or Colorado River to abstain from FDCPA cases. 
                                                          
 111. Elmendorf Grafica, Inc. v. D.S. America (East), Inc., 48 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1995). 
111Id. at 52. 
 113. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431(1982). 
 114. Id.
 115. AXA Corporate Solutions v. Underwriters Reinsurance Corp., 347 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
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IV. WHEN AND WHY FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM 
HEARING FDCPA CASES
Abstention is warranted where the state court action will finally and 
comprehensively resolve all claims in the federal suit.116 Where the federal 
claims are separate from the state claims, and where judgments in both 
suits would not be inconsistent, the court need not abstain.117 Thus, where 
the FDCPA claims are separable from the state action, a federal court 
should not abstain from hearing them. 
Part IV of this note will explore the circumstances under which ab-
stention is appropriate. Subpart A will discuss cases where the FDCPA 
issue is based on the determination of the state court regarding a creditor’s 
interest in the property in question. Subpart B will discuss cases where the 
FDCPA issue is based on the collection practices of the creditor that would 
implicate consumer protections regardless of the validity of the underlying 
debt. Subpart C will examine the similarity of parties between state and 
federal court cases and its implication on the application of abstention doc-
trine. Subpart D will examine whether a stay or dismissal is appropriate 
when the court finds abstention doctrine to be applicable to FDCPA claims. 
A. The Validity of the Underlying Debt 
The FDCPA makes any false and misleading representations regard-
ing the validity of an underlying debt a violation of federal law.118 The act 
breaks misrepresentation down into several categories, including the false 
representation of the amount of a debt, the false representation of the legal 
status of a debt, and the use of any deceptive means to collect or to attempt 
to collect any debt.119 Therefore, many FDCPA claims are based on the 
legitimacy of the underlying debt itself, regardless of the practices engaged 
in by the collector to collect that debt.120
Plaintiffs tend to argue that because they did not owe the debt in the 
first place, the collector’s attempts to collect the debt are a false representa-
                                                          
 116. E.g., Alexander v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 4:10-CV-01535 SWW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
WL 744986, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 24, 2011). 
 117. DeHart v. US Bank, 811 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1046 (D. N.J. 2011). 
 118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74).  
 119. 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1692e(2)(a), 1692e(10) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74). 
 120. See, e.g., Petit v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 12 C 318, 2012 U.S. Dist. Ct. WL 3437287, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2012); Gerald v. Collection Professionals, Inc., No. 01-1152, 01-1114, 01-1143, 
2001 U.S. Dist. WL 793699, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 26, 2001). 
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tion.121 This situation presents the most complex situation for a federal 
court in determining whether to abstain from hearing an FDCPA claim. On 
the one hand, if the debt itself is not owed, the collector is indeed engaging 
in a practice banned by the FDCPA (misrepresentation),122 which is a legit-
imate federal claim. On the other, the determination as to the validity of the 
underlying debt is frequently based entirely on state law. For example, in a 
foreclosure action, it is state law that determines whether the mortgagee has 
a legitimate interest in the underlying mortgage and note.123
Thus, the federal court is left to balance access to a federal forum 
against interference with legitimate state interests. This is the sweet spot of 
abstention doctrine, where the factor-based approach most abstention doc-
trines take is most suitable, whether it is the “legitimate state interest” ar-
ticulated in Younger, or the “wise judicial administration” articulated in 
Colorado River. Unfortunately, for consumers, when the underlying 
FDCPA violation is so wrapped up in state law, it is difficult for the federal 
court to adjudicate. Thus, the consumer is left with fewer options when it 
comes to prosecuting this type of misrepresentation. The majority, though 
not all, of courts abstain in this situation124 because should the state and 
federal actions proceed concurrently, “there is a risk of inconsistent results, 
which would throw the ownership of the subject property in turmoil, and 
lead to an ‘abnormally excessive or deleterious’ result.”125
B. Abstention and Debt Collection Practices 
A more straightforward type of FDCPA violation involves the practic-
es engaged in by a debt collector regardless of the validity of the underly-
ing debt. Even with a valid underlying debt, the FDCPA prohibits certain 
practices including communicating debt information to an unauthorized 
third party, threats of violence, use of profane language, excessive phone 
                                                          
 121. See, e.g., Petit v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 12 C 318, 2012 U.S. Dist. Ct. WL 3437287, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2012); Gerald v. Collection Professionals, Inc., No. 01-1152, 01-1114, 01-1143, 
2001 U.S. Dist. WL 793699, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 26, 2001). 
 122. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74) (A debt collector may not 
use the false representation of the legal status of a debt to collect a debt). 
 123. See, e.g., Petit v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 12 C 318, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 3437287, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2012) (property interest is a matter of state law). 
 124. E.g., id. But see Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 914, 922 (2009) 
(holding that an FDCPA violation with respect to the misrepresentation of the underlying debt does not 
“enjoin or otherwise interfere with the [state foreclosure action.]”). Most courts hold otherwise, con-
cluding that a federal court nullifying a party’s interest in property could result in inconsistent rulings if 
the state court were to find otherwise. Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase Nat. Corp. Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-
CV-423-J-34TEM, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 4529604, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 125. Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase Nat. Corp. Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-423-J-34TEM, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. WL 4529604, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2011) (internal quotations removed). 
2014] ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 1211 
calling, false or misleading representations, etc.126 In these circumstances, a 
party may raise an FDCPA claim either as a counterclaim or defense in a 
state court action or as an independent federal claim, but not both.127 As 
explained in DeHart v. US Bank, if the claim is brought in both forums, the 
federal forum risks rendering a judgment that conflicts with the state court 
judgment, exactly the type of unwise judicial administration Colorado Riv-
er attempts to avoid.128 In DeHart, the federal plaintiff had not brought the 
FDCPA claim in state court, and further, the court found that its determina-
tion on fair debt violations would not impact the underlying foreclosure 
proceeding either way (i.e., even if US Bank foreclosed, they could still be 
held liable for fair debt violations).129
DeHart illustrates the greater flexibility a federal court has to hear 
FDCPA cases concerning collection practices. If the validity of the under-
lying debt is immaterial, then the federal court does not risk issuing a ruling 
inconsistent with the state court. For example, if a debt collector engages in 
abusive practices regarding a mortgage, they can foreclose on a consumer 
in state court while being found liable for abusive practices in federal court 
under the FDCPA since “the mere existence of similarities and common 
issues does not make the cases substantially identical.”130
However, not all federal courts follow this interpretation, as the case 
of Mrs. Gray, which opened this note, demonstrates. There are some courts 
that hold that even where the FDCPA claim is separable from the validity 
of the underlying claim, the federal court should still abstain pending the 
resolution of the state claim.131
                                                          
 126. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692d (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74). 
 127. St. Clair v. Wertzberger, 637 F.Supp.2d 251, 254 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting that plaintiff had made 
FDCPA argument as a defense in the state court action, which the judge rejected). But see Rader v. 
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., No. 07-cv-00635-WDM-MEH, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 3119543, at *9 (D. 
Colo. Oct. 18, 2007) (holding that an FDCPA claim was compulsory in the underlying state court 
action).
 128. DeHart v. US Bank, 811 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1046 (D.N.J. 2011). 
 129. Id.; see also Owens v. Howe, No. 1:04-CV-152, 2004 U.S. Dist. WL 6070565, at *4 (N.D. 
Ind. Nov. 8, 2004) (holding that resolution of the state court case will not dispose of the FDCPA claims 
in the present case). 
 130. See, e.g., Beals v. Bank of Am., N.A., Civ. Act. No. 10-5427 (KSH), 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 
5415174, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011). 
 131. Gray v. Parry, No. 2:07-CV-113, 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 821592, at *5 (D. Utah 2008); see also
Beck v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CIV.A. No. 10-4652, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 3664287, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 19, 2011) (Truth In Lending Act case noting some case law that suggest a loan rescission notice is 
automatic upon receipt by the creditor). 
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C. Party Parity: Abstention in Class Action Federal Cases 
The federal court should elect to exercise jurisdiction over FDCPA ac-
tions brought on behalf of a class, regardless of the nature of the underlying 
state court action. A class action FDCPA claim changes the abstention
analysis in two important ways: (1) the parties to a class action are funda-
mentally different from the single party in the underlying state case and (2) 
piecemeal litigation becomes more likely to occur if the federal court ab-
stains.
Beginning with the former, cases must be found to be parallel to in-
voke Colorado River abstention doctrine.132 To be parallel, the parties must 
be the same.133 While the named plaintiff in a federal class action under the 
FDCPA may be the same party to an underlying state action (e.g., a fore-
closure), the members of the class she represents are not. Therefore, the 
parties are not the same and the cases are not parallel.134
Moving on to the latter, the third factor courts evaluate when consider-
ing abstention under Colorado River is the avoidance of piecemeal litiga-
tion.135 “Piecemeal litigation occurs when different tribunals consider the 
same issue, thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different re-
sults.”136 Simultaneous litigation is “unseemly” and poses two potential 
problems: 
First, a party may try to accelerate or stall proceedings in one of the fo-
rums in order to ensure that the court most likely to rule in its favor will 
decide a particular issue first. Second, the possibility exists that one 
court, unaware that the other court has already ruled, will resolve an is-
sue differently, and create a conflict between the two forums.137
However, because of the impossibility of bringing a class action coun-
terclaim in a state court case, the court avoids piecemeal litigation in a class 
action case by permitting the federal action to move forward, even in light 
of the potential for abuse listed above.138 Each potential class member 
would need to bring their own individual FDCPA counterclaim in their 
state court case, leading to many more proceedings than necessary under 
the single federal class action.139
                                                          
 132. Timoney v. Upper Merion Twp., 66 F. App’x 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 133. Id.
 134. See, e.g., Beals, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 5415174, at *6. 
 135. See AXA Corporate Solutions v. Underwriters Reinsurance Corp., 347 F.3d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 136. See LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1560 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 137. Id.
 138. Beals, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 5415174, at *7. 
 139. Id.
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D. To Stay or Dismiss When Abstaining 
Once a federal court decides to abstain, it is left with the decision to 
either stay or dismiss the federal action. A stay has several advantages, 
including the retention of jurisdiction should the consumer opt to later 
bring his federal claim after the state claim is resolved.140 For example, if a 
state court determines that an underlying debt is not owed, a consumer may 
have a legitimate FDCPA claim based on misrepresentation they can bring 
in the federal forum. The stay makes that process procedurally simple and 
also tolls any statute of limitations on the FDCPA claim. 
CONCLUSION
This survey of federal court abstentions in FDCPA cases shows that 
district courts vary in their application of abstention doctrine, whether it be 
the decision to abstain at all, which doctrine to use in abstention, or the 
nature of the underlying state court case. This note attempts to distinguish 
between two types of FDCPA claims: (1) consumers’ disputes regarding 
the validity of an underlying debt and (2) the practices in which debt col-
lectors engage to collect a debt. 
Federal district courts should always hear FDCPA claims when the 
consumer alleges that the practices of the debt collector do not comply with 
the FDCPA, regardless of the validity of the underlying debt. When Con-
gress passed the FDCPA, they intended to provide access to a forum of the 
consumer’s choice to enforce their rights under the act by serving as private 
attorneys general. Where courts can separate issues of conduct from issues 
of the underlying ownership of the debt, courts should do so. One way 
courts can, and do, make this determination is to determine whether resolu-
tion of the state court claims will necessarily dispose of the federal FDCPA 
claims.141 For example, a federal court can rule on whether a debt collector 
improperly garnished a consumer’s wages, or improperly contacted a con-
sumer’s family members regarding a debt, even if there is an underlying 
state court case on the validity of the debt itself.142 These practices are ex-
actly what Congress found to be “abundant” in the industry, even where a 
debt is legitimate.143
                                                          
 140. CIGNA HealthCare of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kaiser, 294 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 141. Owens v. Howe, No. 1:04-CV-152, 2004 U.S. Dist. WL 6070565, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 8, 
2004) (holding that resolution of the state court case will not dispose of the FDCPA claims in the 
present case).  
 142. Bray v. Cadle Co., No. 4:09-CV-663, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 4053794, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 
2010). 
 143. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-74). 
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On the other hand, where the basis of a consumer’s claim lies exclu-
sively in the validity of an underlying debt that is the subject of a state 
court action, federal courts must stay their hand. While misrepresentation is 
indeed a violation of the FDCPA, in the absence of any other FDCPA 
claims a state court is better suited to make the determination as to the va-
lidity of the underlying debt. Otherwise, the federal court risks “piecemeal 
litigation and inconsistent results.”144 Further, after the state court case is 
resolved, consumers can then bring FDCPA claims in federal court if col-
lectors have misrepresented the legal status of a debt. Abstention, whether 
in the form of a stay or dismissal, preserves a consumer’s right to return to 
the forum. A consistent approach by federal district courts would offer 
direction to consumers as to where and as to when to most efficiently bring 
their FDCPA claims. 
Ultimately, consumers must carefully consider where they want their 
FDCPA claim heard and plead the claim in that forum. Even where it is 
possible for the court to separate claims regarding debt collector’s conduct 
from the validity of an underlying debt, a federal court will abstain from 
hearing the claim in federal court if the party affirmatively pleads the 
FDCPA violation in state court. It is the hope of this note that a consistent 
and defined approach to handling abstention in FDCPA cases will better 
enable consumers to make that choice. 
                                                          
 144. Petit v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 12 C 318, 2012 WL 3437287, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 
14, 2012). 
